2 Twitter: @Lester_Domes Researchers often misinterpret and misrepresent statistical outputs. This abuse has led to a large literature on modification or replacement of testing thresholds and P-values with confidence intervals, Bayes factors, and other devices. Because the core problems appear cognitive rather than statistical, we review some simple proposals to aid researchers in interpreting statistical outputs. These proposals emphasize logical and information concepts over probability, and thus may be more robust to common misinterpretations than are traditional descriptions. The latter treat statistics as referring to targeted hypotheses conditional on background assumptions. In contrast, we advise reinterpretation of P-values and interval estimates in unconditional terms, in which they describe compatibility of data with the entire set of analysis assumptions. We use the Shannon transform of the P-value p, also known as the surprisal or S-value s = −l og (p), to provide a measure of the information supplied by the testing procedure against these assumptions, and to help calibrate intuitions against simple physical experiments like coin tossing. We also advise tabulating or graphing test statistics for alternative hypotheses, and interval estimates for different percentile levels, to thwart fallacies arising from arbitrary dichotomies. We believe these simple reforms are well worth the minor effort they require.
| BACKGROUND
S tatistical inference is fraught with psychological as well as technical difficulties, yet far less attention has been given to cognitive problems than to technical minutiae and computational devices [1, 2] . If the issues that plague science could be resolved by mechanical algorithms, statisticians and computer scientists would have disposed of them long ago. But the core problems are those of human psychology and social environment, one in which researchers apply traditional frameworks based on fallacious rationales [1, 3] . These problems have no mathematical or philosophical solution, and instead require attention to the unglamorous task of developing tools, interpretations and terminology more resistant to misstatement and abuse than what tradition has handed down.
We believe that neglect of these problems is a major contributor to the current crisis of statistics in science [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Several informal descriptions of statistical formulas may be reasonable when strictly adhered to, but nevertheless lead to severe misinterpretations in practice. Users tend to take these extra leaps and shortcuts, hence we need to anticipate implications of terminology and interpretations to improve training. In doing so, we find it remarkable that the P-value is once again at the center of the controversy, despite the fact that some journals strongly discouraged reporting P-values decades ago [10] , and complaints about misinterpretation of statistical significance date back a century [11] [12] [13] . Equally remarkable is the diversity of proposed solutions, ranging from modifications of conventional fixed-cutoff testing [14] [15] [16] [17] to complete abandonment of traditional tests in favor of interval estimates [18] [19] [20] or Bayesian tests [21, 22] ; no consensus • We should teach alternate ways to view P-values and intervals via information measures such as S-values (surprisals), which are the negative logarithms of the P-values; these measures facilitate translation of statistical test results into results from simple physical experiments [25] .
• For quantities targeted for study, we should replace single P-values, S-values, and interval estimates by tables or graphs of P-values or S-values showing results for relevant alternative hypotheses as well as for null hypotheses.
• We should from the start teach that the usual interpre-tations of statistical outputs are often misleading even when they are technically accurate. This is because they condition on background assumptions (i.e., they treat them as given), and thus they ignore what may be serious uncertainty about those assumptions. This deficiency can be most directly and nontechnically addressed by treating those assumptions unconditionally, shifting their logical status from what is assumed to part of what is tested.
We have found that the last recommendation (to decondition inferences [25] ) is the most difficult for most readers to comprehend, and is even resisted and misrepresented by some with extensive credentials in statistics.
Thus, to keep the present paper of manageable length we have written a companion piece, Greenland & Chow, 2019 [27] , which explains in depth the rationale for deemphasizing traditional conditional interpretations in favor of unconditional interpretations.
| AN EXAMPLE
We will display problems and recommendations with published results from a record-based cohort study of serotonergic antidepressant prescriptions during pregnancy and subsequent autism spectrum disorder (ASD) of the child (Brown et al. [28] ). Out of 2,837 pregnancies that had filled prescriptions, approximately 2% of the children were diagnosed with ASD. The paper first reported an adjusted ratio of ASD rates (hazard ratio or HR) of 1.59 when comparing mothers with and without the prescriptions, and 95% confidence limits (CI) of 1.17 and 2.17. This estimate was derived from a proportional-hazards model which included maternal age, parity, calendar year of delivery, neighborhood income quintile, resource use, psychotic disorder, mood disorder, anxiety disorder, alcohol or substance use disorder, use of other serotonergic medications, psychiatric hospitalization during pregnancy, and psychiatric emergency department visit during pregnancy.
The paper then presented an analysis with adjustment based on a high-dimensional propensity score (HDPS), in which the estimated hazard ratio became 1.61 with a 95% CI spanning 0.997 to 2.59. Despite the estimated 61% increase in the hazard rate in the exposed children and an interval estimate including ratios as large as 2.59 and no arXiv: 1909.08579 | Version: 21 Sept. 2019 lower than 0.997, the authors still declared that there was no association between in utero serotonergic antidepressant exposure and ASD because it was not "statistically significant. " This was a misinterpretation of their own results insofar as an association was not only present [29, 30] , and was also quite close to the 70% increase they reported from other studies [31] . Yet the media simply repeated Brown et al. 's misstatement that there was no association after adjustment [32] .
Such misreporting remains common, despite increasing awareness that such dichotomous thinking is detrimental to sound science and ongoing efforts to retire statistical significance [22, 24, 30, [33] [34] [35] . To aid these efforts, we will explain the importance of showing results for a range of hypotheses, which help readers see why conclusions such as in Brown et al. [28, 32] represent dramatic misinterpretations of statistics -even though the reported numeric summaries are correct. We intend our discussion to make clear why it would be correct to instead have reported that "After HDPS adjustment for confounding, a 61% hazard elevation remained; however, under the same model, every hypothesis from no elevation up to a 160% hazard increase had p ≥ 0.05; Thus, while quite imprecise, these results are most consistent with previous observations of a positive association between antidepressant exposure and subsequent ASD (although the association may be partially or wholly due to uncontrolled biases)."
| MAKING SENSE OF TESTS

| THE P-VALUE AS A COMPATIBILITY MEASURE
The infamous observed P-value p (originally called the observed or attained "level of significance" or value of P [36, 37] ) is a measure of compatibility between the ob- [42] . The purpose of this description is to connect the P-value to a familiar object, the percentile at which someone's score fell on a standard test (e.g., a college or graduate admissions examination), as opposed to the abstract (and too easily inverted) probability definition.
| THE S-VALUE
Even when P-values are correctly defined and valid, their scaling can be deceptive due to their compression into the interval from 0 to 1, with vastly different meanings for absolute differences in P-values near 1 and the same differences for P-values near 0 [25] , as we will describe below. One way to reduce test misinterpretations and provide more intuitive numerical results is to take the negative logarithm of the P-value,
, known as the Shannon information, surprisal, logworth, or S-value from the test [25, 38, 43] .
The S-value is designed to avert incorrect intuitive interpretations of statistics that dominate research reports by providing a measure of information supplied by the test against the test hypothesis H [25] .
Obtaining p from standard statistical tests, this information can only be against the test hypothesis because there is no way to distinguish among the infinitude of models that would have the same or larger P-value and hence the same or smaller S-value. This limitation reflects the fact that there is no way the data can support a test hypothesis without adding what may be implausible assumptions to drastically narrow down possible models (e.g., no bias or error in any background assumption). Furthermore, the S-value measures only the information supplied by a particular test when applied to the data. A different test based on different background assumptions will usually produce a different P-value and thus a different S-value; thus it would be a mistake to simply call the S-value "the information against the hypothesis supplied by the data. "
The S-value provides an absolute scale on which to view the information provided by a statistical test, as measured by calibrating P against a physical mechanism that produces data. For a mechanism that produces binary outcomes (e.g., yes/no; positive/negative; up/down; right/left; heads/tails), we express the Svalue on the base-2 log scale, in which case the units of measurement are called bits (short for binary digits) or shannons. As an example, suppose we toss a coin and label 1 = heads, 0 = tails. We can then think of one bit as the amount of information provided by seeing heads on one toss against the hypothesis that the toss is fair vs. loaded (biased) for heads. Now suppose we do k independent tosses of this coin and they all come up heads. Then the total amount of information against fairness provided by this outcome (seeing k heads in a row) is k bits. Thus 4 heads in a row supplies 4 bits of information against fairness in the direction of loading for heads.
Other units for measuring information arise from different choices for the base of the logarithms. For example, using natural (base-e) logs, the S-value units are called nats, while using base-10 logs, the units are called hartleys, bans or dits (decimal digits). The ratio of one dit of information to one bit of information is 3.22
which is similar to the ratio of meters to feet, 3.28. Just as the choice of meters vs. feet does not affect the concepts and methods surrounding length measurement, so choice of dits vs. bits does not affect any of the concepts or methods of information measurement. Bits are most commonly used however because the fundamental physical components in electronic information storage are binary and thus their information capacity is one bit. They also correspond to the information supplied by exactly one binary measurement on a unit, e.g., biologic sex (male/female).
| USING THE S-VALUE
With the S-value in hand, a cognitive difficulty of the P-value scale for evidence can be seen by first noting that the difference in the evidence provided by Pvalues of 0.9999 and 0.90 is trivial: Both represent almost no information against the test hypothesis, in that the corresponding S-values are −l og 2 (0.9999) = 0.00014 bits and −l og 2 (0.90) = 0.15 bits. Both are far less than the 1 bit of information against the hypothesis -they are just a fraction of a coin toss different. In contrast, the information against the test hypothesis in P-values of 0.10 and 0.0001 is profoundly different, in that the corresponding S-values are −l og 2 (0.10) = 3.32 and −l og 2 (0.0001) = 13.29 bits; thus p = 0.001 provides 10 bits more information against the test hypothesis than does p = 0.10, corresponding to the information As an example of this perspective on reported results, from the point and interval estimate from the HDPS analysis reported by Brown et al. [28] , we calculated that the P-value for the "null" test hypothesis H that the hazard ratio is 1 (no association) is 0.0505. Using the S-value to measure the information supplied by the HDPS analysis against this hypothesis, we get s = −l og 2 (0.0505) = 4.31 bits; this hardly more than 4 coin tosses worth of information against no association. For comparison, taking instead the test hypothesis H to be that the hazard ratio is 2 (doubling of the hazard among the treated), we calculated a P-value of 0.373. The information supplied by the HDPS analysis against this test hypothesis is then measured by the S-value as s = −l og 2 (0.373) = 1.42 bits, hardly more than a coin-toss worth of information against doubling of the hazard among the treated. In these terms, then, the HDPS results supply roughly 3 bits more information against the test hypothesis of no association than against doubling of the hazard, so that doubling is more compatible with the analysis results than is no association. S-values can help understand objections to comparing P-values to sharp dichotomies. Consider that P-value of 0.06 yields about 4 bits of information against the test hypothesis H, while a P-value of 0.03 yields about 5 bits of information against H. Thus, p = 0.06 is about as surprising as getting all heads on four fair coin tosses while p = 0.03 is one toss (one bit) more surprising. Even if one is committed to making a decision based on a sharp cutoff, Svalues illustrate what range around that cutoff corresponds to a trivial information difference (e.g., any P-value between 0.025 and 0.10 is less than a coin-toss difference in evidence from p = 0.05).
S-values can also help researchers understand more subtle problems with traditional testing. Consider for example the import of the magical 0.05 threshold (αlevel) that is used to declare associations present or absent. It has often been claimed that this threshold is too high to be regarded representing much evidence against H [21] , but the arguments for that are usually couched in Bayesian terms of which many are skeptical. We can however see those objections to 0.05 straightforwardly by noting that the threshold translates into requiring an S-value of only −l og 2 (0.05) = 4.32 bits of information against the null; that means p = 0.05 is barely more surprising than getting all heads on 4 fair coin tosses. While 4 heads in a row may seem surprising to some intuitions, it does in fact correspond to doing only 4 tosses to study the coin, and so may call into question those intuitions given how little information is contained in a P-value of 0.05, especially in relation to the trillion or so bits of information available on laptop hard drives. As always, further crucial information will be given by P-values and S-values for tabulated for several alternative hypotheses, interval estimates over varying percentiles, and graphs of data and information summaries such as those illustrated below.
| ADVANTAGES OF S-VALUES
Unlike probabilities, S-values are unbounded above and are additive over independent information sources, thus providing a scale for comparing test results across hypotheses that is aligned with information rather than probability measurement [25] . The S-values for testing the same hypothesis from independent studies can thus be summed to provide a measure of the total information against the hypothesis [25, 36] . Another advantage of S-values is that they help thwart inversion fallacies, in which a P-value is misinterpreted as a probability of a hypothesis being correct (or equivalently, as the probability that a statement about the hypothesis is in error). Such probabilities, when computed using the data, are called posterior probabilities (because they come after the data). It is difficult to confuse an S-value with a posterior probability because the S-value is unbounded above, and in fact will be above 1 whenever the P-value is below 0.50.
Probabilities of data given hypotheses and probabilities of hypotheses given data are identically scaled, and users inevitably conflate P-values with posterior probabilities. This confusion dominates observed misinterpretations [38] and is invited with open arms by "significance" and "confidence" terminology. Such fallacies could be avoided by giving actual posterior probabilities along with P-values. Bayesian methods provide such probabilities, but require prior distributions as input; in turn, those priors require justifications that will satisfy most readers. While the task of creating such distributions can be instructive, this extra input burden has greatly deterred adoption of Bayesian methods; in contrast, S-values provide a direct quantification of information without this input. [28] ; it can again be seen that there is about 3 bits more information against the null (equal hazards across treatment, S = 4.3) than against doubling of the hazard (HR = 2, S = 1.4), so any claim that these results demonstrate or support no association is simply wrong.
* Further details of the relations among these measures are given in the Appendix.
TA B LE 2: P-values, S-values, Maximum-Likelihood Ratios, and Likelihood-Ratio Statistics For Various Test Hypotheses About the Hazard Ratio (HR) Computed from Brown et al. [28] HDPS results. † Test Hypothesis (H)
P-value (compatibility)
S-value (bits)
Maximum-
Likelihood Ratio
Likelihood-
Ratio Statistic
Halving of hazard (HR = 0.5) 1.6 × 10 In summary, the S-value provides a gauge of the information supplied by a statistical test, with a simple counting interpretation in familiar terms of coin tosses. It thus complements the probability interpretation of a P-value by supplying a mechanism that is easy to do both thought and physical experiments with. Given amply documented human tendencies to underestimate the frequency of seemingly "unusual" events [47] , these experiments may improve intuitions about what are reasonable frequencies to expect and thus what evidence strength a given P-value actually represents. one a model with no effect of radiotherapy but allowing an effect of chemotherapy, the other allowing an effect of radiotherapy but no effect of chemotherapy, with all other assumptions the same in both models.
| TESTS OF DIFFERENT VALUES FOR A PARAMETER VS. TESTS OF DIFFERENT PARAMETERS
Testing different parameters with the same data raises issues of multiple comparisons (also known as simultaneous inference). These issues are very complex and controversial, with opinions about multiple-comparison adjustment ranging from complete dismissal of adjustments to demands for mindless, routine use. These issues extend far beyond the present scope; see Greenland & Hofman, 2019 [48] and Greenland, 2020 [49] for a recent commentary and a review, respectively. We can only note here that the devices we recommend can be also applied to adjusted comparisons, where the S-value computed from an adjusted P-value becomes the information against a hypothesis penalized (reduced) to account for multiplicity.
| REPLACE UNREALISTIC CONFIDENCE CLAIMS WITH COMPATIBILITY MEASURES
Confidence intervals (commonly abbreviated as CI) have been widely promoted as a solution to the problems of statistical misinterpretation [18, 20] . While we support their presentation, such intervals have difficulties of their own.
The major problem with "confidence" is that it encourages the common confusion of the CI percentile level (typically 95%) with the probability that the true value is in the interval (mistaking the CI for a Bayesian posterior interval) [38] , as in statements such as "we are 95% confident that the true value is within the interval. "
The fact that "confidence" refers to the procedure, not the reported interval, seems to be lost on most researchers; remarking on this subtlety, when Jerzy Neyman discussed his confidence concept in 1934, Arthur Bowley said, "I am not at all sure that the 'confidence' is not a confidence trick" [50, 51] . And indeed, forty years later, Cox and Hinkley [52] warned, "interval estimates cannot be taken as probability statements about parameters, and foremost is the interpretation 'such and such parameter values are consistent with the data.' " Unfortunately, the word "consistency" is used for several other concepts in statistics, while in logic it refers to an absolute condition (of noncontradiction); thus, its use in place of "confidence" would risk further confusion.
To address this problem, we exploit the fact that a 95%
CI summarizes the results of varying the test hypothesis H over a range of parameter values, displaying all values for which P > 0.05 [53] and hence S < 4.32 bits [25, 54] .
Thus, conditional on the background assumptions, the CI contains a range of parameter values that are more compatible with the data than are values outside the interval [25, 38] . Unconditionally (and thus even if the background assumptions are uncertain), the interval shows the values of the parameter which, when combined with the background assumptions, produce a test model that is "highly compatible" with the data in the sense of having less than 4.32 bits of information against it. We thus refer to CI as compatibility intervals rather than confidence intervals [25, 26, 54] ; their abbreviation remains "CI. "
Another problem is that a CI is often used as nothing more than a null-hypothesis significance test (NHST), by declaring that the null parameter value (e.g., HR = 1) is supported if it is inside the interval, or refuted if it is outside the interval. Such use defeats the use of interval estimates for indicating uncertainty about the parameter and perpetuates the fallacy that information changes abruptly across decision boundaries [34, 38, 54, 55] .
In particular, the usual 95% default forces the user's focus onto parameter values that yield p > 0.05, without regard to the trivial difference between (say) p = 0.06 and p = 0.04 (a difference not even worth a coin toss). To address this problem, we first note that a 95% interval estimate is only one of a number of arbitrary dichotomization of possi- 
| GRADATIONS, NOT DICHOTOMIES
Graphs of P-values or their equivalent have been promoted for decades [34, [56] [57] [58] [59] , yet their adoption has been slight. Nonetheless, P-value and S-value graphing software is now available freely through several statistical packages [60] [61] [62] . A graph of the P-values p against possible parameter values allows one to see at a glance which parameter values are most compatible with the data under the background assumptions. This graph is known as the P-value function, or compatibility, consonance, or confidence curve [34, 57, 58, 63, 64] . Transforming the corresponding P-values in the graph to S-values produces an S-value (surprisal) function. Figure 3 give the P-value and S-value graphs produced from the Brown et al. [28] data, displaying an estimated hazard ratio of 1.61 and 95% limits of 0.997, 2.59 (see the Appendix for computational details). Following the common (and important) warning that P-values are not hypothesis probabilities, we caution that the P-value graph is not a probability distribution: It shows compatibility of parameter values with the data, rather than plausibility or probability of those values given the data. This is not a subtle difference: compatibility is a much weaker condition than plausibility. Consider for example that complete fabrication of the data is always an explanation compatible with the data (and indeed has happened in some influential medical studies [65] ), but in studies with many participants and authors involved in all aspects of data collection it becomes so implausible or improbable as to not even merit mention. We emphasize then that all the P-value ever addresses in a direct logical sense is compatibility; for hypothesis probabilities one must turn to Bayesian methods [25] .
Figure 2 and
The P-value graph (Figure 2 whether the null value is included in the 95% CI: Every hazard ratio from 1 to 2.58 is more compatible with the Brown et al. data [28] according to the HDPS analysis, and has less information against it than does the null value of 1. Thus, as the graphs make clear, the analysis provides absolutely no basis for claiming the study found "no association. " Instead, the analysis exhibits an association similar to that seen in earlier studies and should have been reported as such, even though it leaves open the question of what caused the association (e.g., a drug effect, a bias, a positive random error, or some combination).
| MOVING FORWARD
Most efforts to reform statistical reporting have promoted interval estimates [20, 66] or Bayesian methods [21] over P-values. There is nonetheless scant empirical evidence that these or any proposals (including ours) have improved or will improve reporting without accompanying editorial and reviewer efforts to enforce proper interpretations. Instead, the above example and many others [25, 67, 68] illustrate how, without proper editorial monitoring, interval estimates are often of no help and can even be harmful when journals require dichotomous interpretation of results, for example as does JAMA [69] .
We nonetheless argue that such examples show it is imperative to implement simple reforms to traditional terms and interpretations, for those traditions have encouraged numerous overinterpretations and misinterpretations, especially when there is doubt about conventional assumptions. Overconfident terms like "significance, " "confidence," and "severity" [17] and decisive interpretations [14] can be easily replaced with more cautiously graded unconditional compatibility descriptions; narrowly compressed probabilities like P-values can be supplemented with additive-information concepts like S-values; and requests can be made for tables or graphs of P-values and S-values for multiple alternative hypotheses, rather than forcing focus onto a null hypotheses [25, 34, 57, 59] . These reforms need to be given a serious chance via editorial encouragement in both review and instructions to authors.
| APPENDIX
The coin-toss interpretation we have used assumes that the only alternative to fairness is in the direction of loading for heads. The S-value it produces thus corresponds to a P-value for the 1-sided hypothesis P r (he ads) ≤ 1 2 ; nonetheless, this interpretation applies even if the observed P-value p was 2-sided. This translation from a 2-sided P-value to a 1-sided S-value parallels the transformation of P-values into 1-sided sigmas in physics, in which for example a P-value of 0.05 from a two-sided test would become a σ of 1.645, the upper 5% cutoff for a standard-normal deviate [70] .
There are many other measures of information and evidence against a test hypothesis H or test model. One example is the maximum-likelihood ratio (MLR), which is the value of the likelihood function at its maximum under the background model, divided by its (restricted) maximum when the test hypothesis H is added to that model [44, p. 151, 45, p. 156 ]. Like the S-value, the MLR defined this way is always above 1; it is however sometimes confused with posterior odds against the tested value H given the background model, which it equals only under very special (and usually unrealistic) conditions. The MLR does however show the most extreme change in posterior odds against H that the data could produce under the background model. The corresponding information measure paralleling the S-value is the deviance difference or likelihood-ratio (LR) statistic for H given the background model, 2l n(M LR ), which is itself a test statistic for H that provides a conditional P-value and S-value. The change in the Akaike Information Criterion (without small-sample adjustment) from adding H to the background model is this difference minus 2d where d is the dimension (degrees of freedom) of H. Table 1 shows relations under the standard 1 degree-of-freedom (df) χ 2 approximation for the LR statistic when H is a hypothesis that a parameter equals a specific value, e.g., for the hypothesis that a hazard ratio HR equals the number r , H: HR = r . For normal (Gaussian) data these relations are exact and the LR statistic reduces to squared Z -score for the hypothesis [45, p. 156 ]. The S-value and LR statistic track each other rather closely although the latter increases more rapidly. Their relation reflects that, under the test model and the standard approximations, the P-value is uniform and hence the S-value is unit-exponential, which is half a 2 df χ 2 [36] and hence has a heavier right tail than the 1 df LR statistic; specifically, with x = ln (r ), the ratio of densities for the 2 and 1 df χ 2 is proportional to x 1 2 .
For Table 2, Figure 2, and Figure 3 , statistics were computed from the approximate normal distribution used for the CIs in Brown et al. [28] , in which the log-hazard ratio ln(HR) is estimated to have mean m = ln (1.61) and standard deviation d = l n( 2.59 0.997 ) 2(1.96) . The P-value for H: HR = r is then derived from the normal score Z = l n( 1.61 r ) d , and the LR statistic and MLR are approximated by Z 2 and exp( Z 2 2 ). For contrast to the P-value graph in Figure 2, Supplementary Figure 1 Figure 3 , the S-value function. Also plotted is the likelihood interval (LI), which corresponds to the 95% compatibility interval. Computed from results in Brown et al. [28] . MLR = Maximum-Likelihood Ratio. HR = 1 represents no association.
